question:请将“The democratic state form also influences the shape taken by class struggle itself. On the one hand, it dissolves exploited classes into (juridical) individuals, and — further — into voting individuals (individual voters), who are then re-aggregated into various non-class groups on the basis of well-cultivated non-class identities. Electoral success needs numbers. By giving opportunities for full expression to religious, indigenous, racist, casteist, ethnic, and regional identities, the democratic form of the state fragments the exploited classes into members of electoral groups (or, vote banks), and into supporters of this or that party (or fractions thereof). Deliberately ignored are their class position and interests. This process weakens the power and agency of common people as classes. Given the inability of the crisis-prone capitalist system to meet the needs of people, the politics of identity from the top (i.e. politics of identity of the majority community) are deployed by the fascistic forces as foot soldiers of reactionary capitalism. Currently, democracy has enabled the landowning class and elements of the bourgeois class to ‘capture’ specific parts of the state through liberal democratic elections. In parts of the periphery, therefore, proprietors are still able to compel the poor to vote as the politicians of the exploiting classes would like them to. Through their control over specific parts of the state — especially at the local/regional level — property owners appropriate the resources allocated by the state to the poor. On the other hand, by ensuring a limited degree of free association and speech, and through electoral procedures and the ‘rule of law’, the state in its democratic form has indeed allowed rural and urban workers (who form the majority of the population) to voice some opposition to political domination. Within limits, they are permitted to exert pressure on the capitalist state to create conditions for an egalitarian development pattern. The democratic state form has allowed competition between political parties, including the parties of the Left,39 and this has contributed in varying degrees to the politicization of lower classes (as voters) and to the limited implementation of policies on their behalf. Yet the liberal democratic state form itself is a barrier to class politics from below in the periphery as well as the core. 7 Class contradictions of development and threat to peripheral state’s legitimacy From the standpoint of exploited classes, the colonial state did not discharge a developmental role; in part, therefore, the post-colonial state gained a degree of ideological legitimation from its promise to foster economic development, a break with the approach of the colonial state. About this Partha Chatterjee (1993: 203) observes: The new state represented the only legitimate form of the exercise of power because it was a necessary condition for the development of the nation . . . (it) acquired its representativeness by directing a program of economic development on behalf of the nation. Like the colonial state, however, the current neoliberal post-colonial state is not fulfilling a developmental role. Hence the development process no longer discharges for the state the legitimizing role to the same extent it did earlier, in the more optimistic decades following Independence.40 This is certainly true of the way the state is ‘seen’ by ‘those below’ in those areas where there exist very strong radical militant organizations of the rural poor (e.g. the Maoist movement in Asia). There the relative paucity of spending by the neoliberal state on anti-poverty policies — a process termed as ‘the selective retreat of the state’ — has indeed eroded its legitimacy in the eyes of the vast majority of the rural population in terms of promoting development. For lower classes, therefore, the state is not perceived as a ‘caring’ state to the same extent it was earlier, both materially and discursively. Of additional relevance is that the ideological illegitimacy of the colonial state derived from its being ‘other’ economically: that is, it was seen as serving the external (‘foreign’) interests in furtherance of which it licensed the exploitation of workers and peasants. The ideological legitimacy of the post-independence state, and a central emplacement of the nationalist discourse, emanated from the fact that it would be independent of an international capitalism. Hence the legitimacy of the state, say in India, ‘had to flow from the nationalistic criticism of colonialism as an alien and unrepresentative power’ and from the expectation that ‘an independent state . . . would promote national development1 as ‘the historical necessity’ (Chatterjee, 1993: 205; italics added).41 But what is the post-colonial state doing? It is prostrating itself before the imperialism of the IMF, the World Bank, MNCs, and international ‘aid’ agencies. This is an imperialism that is justified and sold to ordinary people through the discourse of development and progress. The post-colonial neoliberal state itself has become a mechanism of new imperialism. The point is that now, as during colonial times, the state, as mentioned earlier, is creating the conditions for the transfer of profits to the foreign capital: indeed, the neoliberal state is actively encouraging international capital to exploit its own lower classes, a process in which domestic capitalists — urban and rural — are invited to participate. The nationalistic dream — the idea that there is a nation and what the state does is good for the nation — may be on the way out. Hence, there is a new national question for the masses: how to transcend the ongoing impact of imperialism which is predominantly practised through economic mechanisms and ultimately backed up by the threat of force?42 If the concept of nation has any significance, it must, first of all, be the ‘nation’ of workers and small-scale producers, yet the neoliberal-capitalist peripheral state is increasingly alienating itself from this ‘nation’. And this is why, and given that the ‘collaboration’ of the peripheral ruling class with imperialism makes anti-imperialist nationalism an empty slogan, there is a need on the part of the ruling classes of the periphery to construct an alternative nation (and nationalism), one that is based on religious, racial, and ethnic identity. This strategy creates phoney internal enemies of the fake nation (the enemies being the religious and racialized minorities, people defending democratic rights and communists/Marxists). As a result, the real nation, the nation of workers and small-scale producers exploited by the ruling classes and subjugated by imperi-alism, is divided and weakened, and it fails to concentrate on the real enemies of the nation (i.e. capitalists, large-scale landowners, and imperialist forces). But this strategy of encouraging fascistic divisive tendencies however can contribute to delegitimization of (the democratic form of) the state. Another contributory factor in this delegitimization process is that action by the neoliberal state is perceived to lack rationality. The colonial state was exporting food to the UK when in the colonies the population did not have sufficient food to eat. In a similar vein, the neoliberal state is now seen as irrational in promoting the production of luxury commodities (such as flowers, shrimps, and animal feed) or minerals and energy for export to imperialist/ rich countries, when millions are malnourished/hungry at home and/or are without regular supply of energy and other industrially produced necessaries throughout the year. The state is under pressure from nationally operating and multi-national agribusiness to crush small-scale producers, which has been prompting mass protests. The state-promoted export of these commodities is itself based on cheap labour and cheap land. ‘Cheap’, however, hides the ecological and social conditions under which these commodities are produced by peasants and workers. Cheapness is not a characteristic innate to a country in the periphery, either to the (tattered) bodies of its workforce or to its (degraded) nature, both of which are deployed by neoliberal capitalist accumulation. The perceived difference between the colonial state and its post-colonial counterpart — a crucial ideological one — thus no longer holds.43 This is because the state is no longer able to sustain even the fiction of carrying out policies designed to benefit large swathes of the polity — the ‘people’ who form ‘the nation’, in other words. The failure is more drastic with the turn to neoliberalism and to right-wing politics associated with the rise of right-wing parties (e.g. Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party or National People’s Party and Bolsanaro’s Social Liberal Party of Brazil). In fact, the neoliberal state form and state intervention (the state’s relative withdrawal from welfare provision and a certain degree of control over the business class) were justified on the basis that the neoliberal state is good for the masses, but this has turned out to be a lie. Neoliberalization has hurt the masses, including by dispossessing them of their small-scale property, so the neoliberal form of the state does not have the legitimacy in the minds of the ordinary people.44 Apart from the differences/contradictions between the colonial state and the post-colonial state, there are important differences/contradictions between the pre-neoliberal state and the neoliberal state. While the personnel of the state before the onset of neoliberalism, often drawn from lower strata of society (e.g. petty-bourgeois strata), maintained some distance between them and the capitalist class, now the personnel of the state revel in their connections with, and take pride from their work for, the business class. The social legitimacy of the state clearly is at stake because the state, at least, has to give the appearance that it is neutral, that it is for everyone, for all classes. But maintaining such an appearance is difficult because of a distinctive change in the class character of the personnel of the state. Prabhat Patnaik (2010) eloquently describes this pre-neoliberal process: ‘The State was a bourgeois State, laying the foundations for capitalist development. But the motivation, the ideological inclinations, and the class background of the State personnel ensured that the State had a degree of autonomy both vis-à-vis imperialism and also vis-à-vis the domestic capitalists’.45 This autonomy was there in the sense that state actors, drawn from the ranks of the petty-bourgeoisie, ‘were generally skeptical about, and even to a degree hostile to, the capitalist class and were committed to State capitalism which they also saw as a means of self-advancement in the new situation of de-colonization’ (ibid.). However, something has changed with the turn to neoliberalism. Patnaik (2010) explains:”翻译为中文

question:请将“The ‘neo-liberal State’ too is a bourgeois State like the dirigiste State, but the personnel of the former differ fundamentally from the personnel of the latter, not just in their ideological predilections, which are closely aligned to the views of the Bretton Woods institutions, but also in their being deeply enmeshed with the world of finance and big business. Therefore, What we find in today’s State personnel is not just a different set of ideologues, World Bank ideologues, as distinct from the Nehruvian [i.e. secular bourgeois-nationalist] ideologues that manned the dirigiste bourgeois State, but a set whose motivation is no different from that of the big bourgeoisie and financial interests and which therefore has no compunctions about being closely integrated with the latter. More specifically: The personnel of the neo-liberal State have little interest in running the public sector, which is one reason why the public sector becomes financially unviable over time, and provides grist to the mill of those who want it privatized. Even normal government functions are not carried out by the bureaucracy, which is more interested in networking with patrons in the world of corporates and foreign donors, or in attending World Bank- sponsored training programmes, than in the nitty-gritty of administration. More and more government functions as a result are ‘outsourced’ to private agencies, which promises profits for all. (Patnaik, 2010) Partly as a result of this change in the personnel and in the mode of functioning of the state, there has been an ‘undermining of the social legitimacy of the State’, and this is happening ‘especially in the context of the tremendous increase in wealth and income inequalities associated with the pursuit of the neo-liberal strategy’ (Patnaik, 2010). Whether all these structural conditions will actually result in a legitimation crisis, and to what extent, will, of course, depend on how the lower classes and their political parties and their organic intellectuals at home and internationally respond to these conditions politically. And to the degree that the crisis does take shape, much also will depend on how the state reacts, in particular its resort to coercive power at its disposal with the help of its imperialist mentors, and in turn how lower classes respond to this. 8 Summary, and theoretical and political implications The main aim of this book has been to explicitly re-assert the class character of the state. The main aim of this chapter has been to explicitly re-assert the class character of the state in the periphery. The periphery is characterized by the combined coexistence of different modes of production under the dominance of capitalism and is under the impact of imperialism. So there is a greater number of classes and fractions than in the centre. This complicated class structure shapes the state. Class relations and the attendant material conditions — including imperialism — constitute the most important context for all forms of intervention by the state and for the very form (territorial and political form) of the state itself. Of course, within this class context other social relations — that is, those of caste, religion, ethnicity, region, and nation — operate and influence the state and its class character. Because capitalism is the dominant mode of production in a typical peripheral country, the state is a capitalist state, and thus an agent of capitalist development, even if small-scale producers have a massive presence in the periphery. This is the case both in pre-neoliberal and neoliberal times and both in rural areas and city-regions. The relation of partnership between the two arms of the capitalist class relation — the state and the capitalist class — has been justified in terms of two major ideologies. One is of state control and socialism (many states such as India and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Nicaragua, and so on originally, were called socialist, or they have had references to socialism in their constitution). Another is one of free market. The ideology of state control over the business world in the early years of the post-independence period was not entirely a lie. There was a degree of state control. There was a degree of state intervention on behalf of the masses. Even the ruling class understood from the very beginning that a small degree of state control and a small degree of propoor re-distribution is a remedy to potential social upheaval against all forms of private property or against the danger of anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggle growing over into anti-capitalist class relations. In the neoliberal times, the ideology of free market has justified serious intervention in the interest of capital and enabled by a change in the personnel. It is however important not to over-emphasize this change in personnel. It is the capitalist class character of neoliberalism that has led to the state being managed by bourgeois personnel (people who either include members of the bourgeoisie or who are shaped by bourgeois ideas and aspirations), and that in turn is responsible for the ongoing reproduction of the capitalist-neoliberal order. The state has always worked, more or less, in the interest of the capitalist class. Its policies (as well its liberal democratic form where it exists) have been accordingly influenced by the interests/actions of the dominant classes, although they have also been, to some extent, shaped by the actuality/possibil- ity of class struggle from below. Like any capitalist state, the peripheral state must sustain the myth that capi-talist accumulation (which goes by the name of ‘growth’) benefits not only the already-better-off entrepreneurs but also the poor. The myth needed is that the exploiters (misnamed as employers, wealth creators, and so on) and the exploited benefit from the same process. The legitimacy of the post-colonial state derived in no small measure from two assumptions: that, unlike colonial government which served ‘foreign’ interests, it would serve domestic ones; and that, to this end, it would promote economic development from which the nation as a whole would benefit. Increasingly, however, the distinction between the colonial and post-colonial development projects is being eroded, as the neoliberal state not only facilitates the dispossession and exploitation of the poor by international and domestic capital. Farm crops are once again being seen to be produced mainly for an elite (= ‘foreign’) market, much as they were during the colonial era. This can contribute to the broader process of delegitimizing the development state, a situation which in turn intensifies class struggle ‘from below’, and the repressive ‘from above’ response by the neoliberal state protecting the interests of the capitalist class. The periphery should not be merely seen as having less income. It should be seen in terms of its class-capitalist character. To say that the peripheral social formation is decidedly capitalist has a different political implication, including for the relation between lower classes and the state, than the contrary view which is that (a) the social formation is not dominantly capitalist or that it is capitalist in limited ways and (b) obstacles to capitalist development are in pre- or non-capitalist relations. Implicit are two ideas here. One is that the capitalist class relation is everywhere and all times associated with higher level of development of productive forces. Another is that the obstacles to capitalist development are not in capitalism as a class relation as such and can be removed by forces other than those that seek to abolish capitalism. That is, a democratic state operating within the logic of capitalist relations can remove these barriers and promote a nicer form of capitalism, independent from capitalism. If a peripheral country is dominantly semi-feudal or if it is not capitalist enough, then the radical strategy is one that is to be directed against semifeudal landlords or at the creation of advanced capitalism somehow. This strategy licenses a long and indefinite wait for the fight for socialism (= abolition of class relations) to start and requires collaboration with some good (progressive = anti-feudal, nationalistic, democratic, and so on) capitalists. But if what is present is already capitalism, albeit one that is not very progressive,46 and one that is not going to be very progressive for a long period of time because of all the constraints on the transition to RSL within the contemporary imperialist world market, and if there are forces that make the appropriation of absolute surplus value salient, then the nature of class politics in relation to the state must be seen in an entirely different manner: this means that revolution as the highest point of class struggle against capitalism and its state must be on the agenda right now, as in the core countries. But does this mean that one cannot fight for reforms within capitalism? Or, more specifically, does this mean that, for example, small-scale producers’ demand for access to means of production (e.g. land and/or credit) or workers’ struggle for higher wages and public provisioning of use-values can be ignored? The answer is no: within limits, the fight for land and for other such concessions is a means of political mobilization of the masses, and under the pressure of mass mobilization, some land redistribution and some increase in private and public wages might even happen under a bourgeois (or bourgeois-landlord) state. In the periphery and in the core, the masses must make a demand on the state around radical needs (as represented in transitional demands discussed earlier). Radical needs are the real needs of the masses, not the needs which the system says it can afford to meet, and are connected to the roots in the relations of production and exchange and in state power. The masses should democratically organize themselves over multiple ‘rights’: right to employment (including the right to more land and other farm inputs for poor peasants in agrarian economies), a living wage, a reduced working day, increased leisure, decent and affordable housing, high-quality healthcare and education as well as culture.47 They should fight for the right-to-decent financial support for the elderly and the disabled, and the right to a healthy and safe environment at work and in neighbourhoods. Those who have small amounts of means of production must have access to more, and the state should ensure complete freedom from exploitation by landlords, merchants, and usurers (e.g. payday lenders in some advanced countries). The masses must fight for the defence of democratic rights, including those of aboriginal populations and religious and racialized minorities. They must demand democratic control over landed and financial aristocrats and over capitalist monopolies as an immediate step necessary to satisfy the fulfilment of their social needs, especially those monopolies which control the production of things and services (e.g. food items and seeds, medicines, houses, clothes, utilities, and so on) without which radical needs cannot be met and people cannot live like humans. It is, of course, clear that the poor masses cannot rely on the bourgeoisie and its state.48”翻译为中文

question:请将“In other words, to begin with, the masses as well as their organic intellectuals must re-imagine democracy as it originally was and as it should be: the democracy of the poor, who are the majority. Democracy is much more than being able to vote for this or that person or party once every few years to run the affairs of the capitalist state. It must be about the control over the ways society’s resources are used and over the ways in which the state institutions work and deal with the majority, the exploited classes, the poor. At the minimum, the masses must demand a thorough democratization of the state as a transitional political demand. This means that excessive power (in the sense of ‘power over’) of the (secretive) civil servants and politicians must be stripped. Committees or councils of common citizens (workers, small-scale producers, and their organic intellectuals and political representatives) in different spheres of society must be formed. They must have direct oversight over the activity of the civil servants, including their income and daily interactions with politicians and business people as well as over politicians and state-owned and private enterprises. They must militantly defend democratic rights against fascistic attacks on minorities and anyone else. All the deals that the state makes with the capitalists must be subjected to popular scrutiny. This re-imagining of democracy must be a part of the project of conquest of state power and establishment of socialism. The periphery, where most of the global population live, has its own specifi-cities. Yet, increasingly, the mechanisms behind the conditions of wage earners and small-scale producers there and in the core are similar. Shrinking income and consumption of the toiling classes are the characteristic aspects of (neoliberal) capitalism everywhere. This means that there a potential basis for international solidarity of working class and small-scale self-employed producers against capital, including its neoliberal incarnation, everywhere and at all scales. While the masses must struggle for all possible political and economic con-cessions, they cannot have any illusion that the current state, in the periphery and in the core, can return to a pre-neoliberal state which defends democratic rights, including of minorities. It is only a state under the control of the proletariat allied with small-scale producers, following a socialist revolution, that can meet the economic and political needs of the masses. Only such a state, in the context of the periphery, for example, can successfully carry out land redistribution and stop the beneficiaries from losing their land through coercive dispossession or market-based class differentiation.49 Only such a state, freed from capitalists’ control and the constraints of the law of value, can, both in the core and in the periphery, successfully create well-paying and secure jobs for all, invest in social and physical infrastructure, and secure ecological sustainability. The capitalist state, in the periphery or in the core, cannot significantly and durably solve the problems created by capitalism, a system that the state must protect. So, the core of the political agenda, in imperialist and imperialized countries, must be the anti-capitalist struggle of the working class against the totality of capitalist class relation, including in its most general form (i.e. FSL). The working class must be politically allied with, and lead, small-scale producers who are adversely impacted by the capitalist class (and by its class partner, that is, rent-receiving landowners, where they exist) to overthrow the capitalist state. It is futile and mistaken to expect that this state will wither away under the pressure of the struggle for reforms. The withering idea in Marxism applies not to the capitalist state, but to the post-revolution, transitional proletarian state. The combined and common goal of the two toiling classes must be a socialist state in place of the existing capitalist state. The socialist state is a state of and for workers and small-scale producers, who constitute the majority of the population. By driving all propertied classes from their ruling positions and by stopping them from returning, such a state can create conditions for a higher level of development of productive forces, economic and geographical equality, and ecological sustainability. It will create conditions for a society without economic exploitation, social oppression, imperialism and the constant threat of war, a society where material and cultural needs of all men, women, and children are met. By creating these conditions, the proletarian state will ultimately make its own existence unnecessary. A global society without class exploitation does not require a state. ”翻译为中文

question:Привет. В моей игре уровень развития цивилизации определяется по 4 критериям по 10-ти бальной шкале, где 1 уровень первобытной эпохи, а 10 недалёкого будущего. Помоги придумать название для каждого из 10 уровней для каждой из 4 критериев. Вот критерии: 1. Обычные технологии 2. Магические технологии 3. Экономическое устройство общества 4. Социальное устройство общева